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Productivity Measurement in a Service Industry:  
Plant-Level Evidence From Gambling Establishments in the United Kingdom 
 
Abstract 
Gambling is one of the fastest growing service industries.  Unfortunately, there have been 
no studies of total factor productivity (TFP) in this sector.  The purpose of this paper is to fill this 
gap, based on an analysis of U.K. establishment-level data.   These data are derived from the 
Annual Respondents Database (ARD) file, constructed by the U.K. Office for National Statistics, 
consisting of individual establishment records from the Annual Census of Production.  The ARD 
file contains detailed data on output, materials, energy, employment, and numerous plant and firm 
characteristics and is quite similar to the U.S.-based Longitudinal Research Database (LRD).  This 
information can be used to construct measures of TFP.  We also construct estimates of labour 
productivity, since TFP is may be measured with error.   
We use these data to estimate labour and total factor productivity equations based on a 
stochastic frontier production function framework.  The latter approach enables us to assess 
whether investment in information technology enhances relative productivity.  Our preliminary 
results suggest that the production function models fit well, generating plausible elasticity 
estimates and indicating constant returns to scale.  While investment in computers per se does not 
appear to have a productivity enhancing effect, gambling establishments that use Internet-based 
technology appear to be closer to the frontier.   3 
I. Introduction 
As predicted in a seminal paper by William Baumol (Baumol, 1967), the service sector has 
continued to grow much more rapidly than the goods sector in advanced industrial economies.  
Given that service industries now constitute a large proportion of economic activity, the assessment 
of productivity in such sectors has become even more important aspect of the public policy agenda.  
However, as noted in Griliches (1994) and Nordhaus (2002), it is notoriously difficult to measure 
productivity in service industries (mainly due to problems with output deflators) and in some cases, 
even in defining the relevant output.   
Gambling is one of the fastest growing service industries.  While there has been 
considerable attention paid to the rise in gambling revenue, there have been virtually no studies of 
total factor productivity (henceforth, TFP) in this sector.  The purpose of this paper is to fill this 
gap, based on an analysis of U.K. establishment-level data.   These data are derived from the 
Annual Respondents Database (ARD) file, constructed by the U.K. Office for National Statistics, 
consisting of individual establishment records from the Annual Census of Production.  The ARD 
file contains detailed data on output, capital, materials, employment, and numerous plant and firm 
characteristics and is quite similar to the U.S.-based Longitudinal Research Database (LRD).  This 
information can be used to construct measures of TFP.   
The use of plant-level data offers two key advantages.  One advantage is that deflation is 
not likely to be a serious a problem, since plants in the same industry are likely to face similar 
factor prices.  The ARD also contains information on relatively homogeneous plants.  Thus, 
measurement errors relating to difference in output mixes are not likely to be as severe.  A second 
advantage is that the use of plant-level data allows us to assess and explain (with additional plant 
and firm characteristic) relative productivity.  We are especially interested in assessing the   4 
relationship between proxies for investment in information technology and TFP.  There is limited 
evidence on the impact of information technology on economic performance in services.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we discuss general 
issues in productivity measurement.   Section III presents some background information on the 
U.K. gambling industry.  Section IV describes the rich, longitudinal dataset that we use to assess 
and explain the relative productivity of gambling establishments.  Section V presents the 
econometric method used to assess and explain relative productivity.   The following section 
contains our empirical results.  Section VII presents preliminary conclusions.   
II. General Issues in Productivity Measurement in Services 
  To compute real output, data are required on turnover or receipts, as well as a price index to 
deflate nominal output.
1  Unfortunately, producer or wholesale price indexes are not available for 
the outputs of many service industries because of the great difficulty in defining measurable units 
of output and adjusting for quality changes.  We will consider the latter issue first.  Changes in 
quality result from heterogeneous inputs and outputs and shifting weights in the use of such inputs 
and outputs.  They also arise from the introduction of new products and services and the 
disappearance of old ones.  An increase in the rate of technological change (e.g., the rise in 
computer investment) can potentially exacerbate difficulties in adjusting prices for changes in 
quality.   
  Although it is usually relatively easy to identify the resources used to produce services (i.e., 
capital, labour, and materials), there is still the problem of deflation of inputs.  Academics have 
been especially frustrated at the difficulty in constructing accurate measures of capital input, which 
would be used in constructing estimates of capital productivity index as well as a total factor 
                                                 
1 As we will discuss later in this report, deflation is not as serious a problem when researchers have access to 
establishment-level data.    5 
productivity index.  Therefore, many researchers have resigned themselves to the analysis of 
labour productivity, typically measured as real output divided by the number of employees or 
hours worked.  The benefit of LP is that is likely to be measured with greater precision than TFP.  
However, LP measures do not take account of the possibility that companies may substitute capital 
for labour, as is likely in an industry experiencing rapid technological change.  Still, McGuckin and 
Nguyen (1995), Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), and Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2000) 
have made inferences regarding overall economic efficiency based on labour productivity indices.  
  There is a disadvantage associated with using the simpler productivity measure.  As noted 
by Perloff and Wachter (1980: 116), the use of Q/L, or the average product of labour, as a measure 
of productivity has “numerous serious, if not quite fatal conceptual flaws”.  Christiansen and 
Haveman (1980: 3) assert that “although [these] productivity measures … have serious 
weaknesses, the picture of productivity change which they yield is not greatly different from that of 
more complete measures.”  
  Three flaws can be enumerated.  First, to ensure reliability, output and input measures must 
be consistent, i.e., they must refer to the same production activity. Since there are many production 
activities implicitly underlying any aggregate measure of output, a meaningful composite measure 
must be formulated by denominating the value of each output measure by an appropriate price 
index. However, when labour is denominated in hours, conceptual problems arise because a labour 
hours measure corrects for only one of the many heterogeneous aspects of workers, namely and 
obviously the number of hours each works. Additional adjustments are needed. For example, the 
age/sex/skill composition of the labour force varies over time as well as from sector to sector. 
Since average labour productivity indices are primarily used for inter-temporal comparisons, 
changes in the composition of the work force will affect measured Q, but will not be reflected 
accurately in a Q/L index unless the changes are perfectly correlated with the way L is measured.   6 
This conceptual problem can be overcome by adjusting L for the heterogeneity of the labour force 
and thereby creating an index with efficiency labour units in the denominator. 
  Chinloy (1980) describes one method for constructing such an index based on methods used 
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  This index is calculated on the basis of changes in 
both the number of hours worked and hourly wages earned by different types of workers, classified 
by age and education level.  Similar indexes of labour productivity or quality have been used by 
Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) and Dean, Kunze, and Rosenblum (1988) in studies of 
aggregate economic growth. It is important to note that these indexes are also based on the 
assumption that labour markets are perfectly competitive, as noted in Chinloy (1980). 
  Chinloy (1980) defines labour quality, LQ, changes as: 
(∂ℓn LQt/∂t) =  Σi ( vit – bit ) (∂ℓn hit/∂t)           (1) 
where hit is hours worked by the ith type of labour in year t, vit is the share of total compensation 
paid to the ith type of labour, and {bit = (hit / mt)}, the share of total hours worked devoted to the ith 
labour type and m denotes total hours.  The discrete approximation for equation (1) is: 
QUALINDt =  Σi ½ (vit + vi,t-1) (ℓn hit - ℓn hi,t-1) – (ℓn mt – ℓn mt-1)    (2) 
where QUALINDt is a quality index that approximates the left-hand-side of equation (9). In 
constructing these indexes, the key data requirements are a set of employment attributes to identify 
each of the i different types of labour.  
  Several ways are used to aggregate over heterogeneous outputs in either partial factor 
productivity or total factor productivity indices. The base year approach adjusts output values by 
the price of each product in the base year. The deflated price approach adjusts the value of each 
product by a current average price index. The choice between the two approaches is important. 
According to Baumol and Wolff (1984), the base year measure is a defensible index for   7 
productivity growth comparisons.  However, the authors point out that it is not a useful indicator of 
inter-industry or inter-sectoral differences in absolute levels of productivity. Similarly, the deflated 
price index is meaningful for intra-industry comparisons of absolute levels of productivity over 
time, but it too fails to provide meaningful cross-sectional comparisons.  The search for a valid 
cross-sectional index of absolute production still continues. 
  A second problem with labour productivity measures is that the average product of labour 
could be related to the business cycle.  Thus, such measures may be capturing effects that are 
unrelated to technical progress.  In this regard, Gordon (1979) contends that firms retain more 
workers in the last stage of a business cycle than is justified ex post by the future level of output. 
As a result of such biased ex ante expectations, Q/L will decline absolutely until firms adjust their 
hiring patterns to their corrected expectations about future demand. 
  A third and perhaps the most serious concern regarding labour productivity measures is that 
neither labour nor capital is the sole source of productivity improvements. Labour-saving 
improvements resulting from other factors of production are improperly attributed as an 
improvement in labour productivity when these other factors are not held constant.  That is, a 
major problem with the use of labour productivity as a metric for economic performance is that it 
measures the efficiency of only one input and does not control for the possibility that the plant, 
firm, or industry, can substitute capital, materials, or services for labour.  Many shun partial factor 
productivity indices precisely for this reason. A useful and meaningful productivity framework 
must therefore identity the source of the productivity improvement and their interaction with other 
factors of production, such as capital, materials, and services in the overall production process. 
Along similar lines, Craig and Harris (1973) showed that partial factor productivity measures do 
not quantify the impact of technical substitution. If, for example, a new technology is embodied in 
capital, Q/L could rise as a result of capital for labour substitution, ceteris paribus. But if the cost   8 
of the new capital-embodied technology equals the cost savings from fewer workers, then total 
production costs are unchanged and the initial movement in Q/L is misleading with regard to actual 
productivity gains.  In light of these concerns, we deemed it prudent to present econometric 
findings based on TFP and LP measures. 
  The consideration of measurement errors in the service sector is not new.  In many service 
industries, the output price index is a Tornqvist average of input price changes, based on input-
output tables.
2  The use of input-based indexes, however, does not take into account changes in the 
production process.  Therefore, the use of the input-output tables may be a source of measurement 
error.  In addition, as noted in previous sections of this report, input indexes are not immune from 
the problem of properly accounting for the effects of changes in quality. 
  As a result, it is perhaps not surprising that Baily and Gordon (1988), in their seminal study 
of productivity in services, identified severe errors of measurement in service sector prices.  
However, they also concluded that there is no evidence to suggest that such measurement errors 
are getting worse over time.  Siegel (1994, 1995, and 1997) presents similar findings, using 
multiple indicators of price changes.  More specifically, he examined the incidence of 
measurement errors in output prices caused by incomplete adjustments for quality change.  
Estimating several variants of a latent variables model, he found that these errors appear to be 
constant over time.  These findings are highly relevant to our work because we will estimate 
service sector productivity growth using panel data. 
  In addition to concerns regarding the accuracy of input and output prices, domestic and 
foreign outsourcing is also a potential source of measurement error (see Siegel-Griliches (1992)).  
That is, levels and changes in productivity could be driven by systematic underestimation of input 
                                                 
2 Gullickson and Harper (1987) report that producer prices are available only for some selected services, such 
as repair services and real estate and rental.   9 
growth caused by increases in foreign and domestic outsourcing.  Thankfully there does not appear 
to be a compelling reason to believe that outsourcing exacerbates errors of measurement of service 
sector productivity. The provision of services (e.g., health care) is mainly a local phenomenon and 
there not appear to be substantial outsourcing across industries, as there is in manufacturing.   
  Indeed, some authors have asserted that outsourcing leads to systematic understatement of 
input growth, and thus, overstatement of productivity growth.  But even in manufacturing, there is 
considerable evidence (see Siegel-Griliches (1992), Siegel (1995), and ten Raa and Wolff (2001)) 
suggesting that outsourcing cannot ‘explain’ the recent acceleration in manufacturing productivity 
growth.  Still, we must be mindful about the potential effects of measurement error on our 
empirical results. 
  We have reason to believe that the measurement difficulties cited in this section can be 
overcome, given the availability of establishment-level data.  The primary focus of our analysis 
will be on assessing levels of relative productivity. The quality change problem is more severe in 
computing absolute or relative productivity growth.  We propose to undertake an analysis of 
productivity in gambling at two levels of aggregation.  The first unit of analysis will be the 
industry, in which case we will examine changes in productivity over time.  The apparent 
constancy of measurement errors bodes well for the accuracy of such productivity growth 
measures. 
  Most importantly, however, the primary unit of observation will be the establishment or 
plant.  The use of establishment level data allows us to measure and ‘explain’ relative productivity, 
and thus, conduct analysis of ‘best practices’.  This is a critical feature of our empirical analysis 
and one that allows for a much richer and much more accurate assessment and explanation of 
productivity.  For example, it seems highly reasonable to assume that plants in the same industry 
face the same factor prices and generate similar output mixes.  While there may be regional   10 
differences in wages, our use of regional dummy variables in the econometric specification 
controls for such variation. 
 
III. Background Information on the U.K. Gambling Industry  
We now provide some background information on the salient characteristics of gambling 
markets and recent industry trends.   One fundamental trend in the U.K. has been the rise in 
gambling activity outside the traditional betting parlour, via telephone or Internet access, including 
betting exchanges and Interactive TV betting.  The remarkable growth in the incidence of virtual 
gaming machines (Fixed-Odds Betting Terminals, or FOBTs) in betting shops, has served to 
reinforce this trend.   
On the financial side, there was a radical change in tax rates and structure of taxation in 
October 2001 (see Paton, Siegel, and Vaughan Williams (2002)), moving away from a tax on gross 
revenue to a tax on gross profits, and effectively halving the incidence of taxation on bookmakers.  
This has enhanced the competitiveness of U.K. firms and also caused a shift towards low-margin, 
high-turnover, capital-intensive products, such as FOBTs, which offer ‘virtual’ betting products, 
ranging from roulette to horse racing.   
A notable shift in the structure of gaming has occurred towards video-based technology and 
machines-based gaming in the casino industry.  The impact of new technology on the gaming 
machine market has been limited by consumer resistance to video-based reels in the core AWP 
market and the club/jackpot sector, but it has had a significant impact on the SWP sector.  A key 
growth area for bingo operators in recent years has also been in machine income and high-margin 
mechanised cash bingo (MCB) income.  There has also been rapid growth in off-shore Internet   11 
gaming sites, in particular Internet casinos, reliant on capital-intensive technology.  Section 3.4 
concludes. 
U.K. betting markets (as distinct from gaming markets) can be divided into five sectors: 
off-course betting at licensed outlets (the dominant venue for betting), on-course betting, and 
betting by telephone (through deposit or credit accounts, or via debit cards), Internet betting and 
Interactive (via TV) betting.  Betting can be further sub-divided into fixed-odds betting with 
bookmakers, pool (parimutuel) betting with the Horserace Totalisator Board (the Tote), ‘spread 
betting’ and bet brokerage (‘exchange’ betting). 
The remote betting sector has grown rapidly, particularly since 2000, as the technology for 
placing bets has become increasingly integral to consumers' everyday lives - notably the Internet, 
interactive TV (as the digital sector has grown) and then latest developments in hand-held mobile 
access technology.  There has also been a steady growth in the number of multi-telephone line 
households and broad band connections, enabling easy access to Internet betting opportunities.   A 
significant growth in offshore betting turnover placed by U.K. citizens can also be traced to the 
independent bookmaker, Victor Chandler, who set up in the late 1990s a tax-free (though not 
commission-free) operation in Gibraltar.   
Another change has been the growth in the number and variety of betting operators who set 
up operations with no shops, but simply as a remote betting force, e.g. Betfair, Betdaq, 
Sportingoptions, Sportingbet, Blue Square. Driven by the likely consequences for the competitive 
base of U.K.-based bookmaking, and associated tax revenue implications, a tax based on the 
turnover (revenue) of betting operators was replaced in October 2001 by a tax based on their 'gross 
profits' (i.e. the difference between what they receive from bettors and what they paid out to 
bettors), essentially replacing a tax on quantity with a more allocatively efficient tax on price.  This 
was accompanied by the larger U.K. bookmakers repatriating offshore operations and the abolition   12 
of deductions levied on bettors' stakes or winnings.  Since 2001, betting turnover has grown 
substantially, although margins have fallen.  Betting turnover placed with offshore bookmakers has 
in significant part been repatriated on-shore. 
Internet access has also grown rapidly during the past seven years. Research carried out by 
MORI on behalf of Mintel (2003) found that 48% of consumers had access to the Internet, which 
represented an increase from 15% in March 1998.  Table 2 provides a more detailed demographic 
breakdown of home/work/place of study Internet users.  
In terms of access to digital TV, Mintel (2003) estimated that around 42% of households 
have digital TV, delivered either via satellite or cable.  Continental Research found in March 2001 
that 46% of households with digital TV had used the interactive services, with the most popular 
being pay-per-view movies, radio, computer games and pay-per-view sports.  
In terms of the off-course market, an attempt by Ladbrokes to take over the betting shops of 
Coral Racing was blocked by the then Monopolies and Mergers Commission, although the 
dominating control by the big bookmakers (Ladbrokes, Williams Hill, Coral, Tote, Stanley) has 
essentially continued.  The monopoly pricing of the Computerized Straight Forecast offers an 
important perspective on this structural framework (see Paton and Vaughan Williams, 2001).   
A key distinction must be made between the U.K. betting and gaming sectors.  The major 
sectors of the gaming industry are gaming machines, bingo and casinos.  The National Lottery can 
also be considered to be part of the industry.   
In the following section, we describe the rich, longitudinal dataset used to assess and 
explain the relative productivity of gambling establishments. 
   13 
IV. Assessing Gambling Productivity Using the Annual Respondents Database 
(ARD)  
 
The Annual Respondents Database (henceforth, ARD) is a plant-level file based on the 
Annual Business Inquiry, a survey conducted by the Office for National Statistics.  Information is 
collected on a range of variables covering output, employment, investment and expenditure for 
samples of businesses across the range of industrial sectors.  Some variables, such as those relating 
to the firm’s Internet presence, are not collected on an annual basis. 
Firms are selected for inclusion in the ABI from the Inter-Departmental Business Register 
(IDBR) at the ONS.  Sampling is based on size by employment on the Register.  The probability of 
being selected for the ABI increases with employment size and the largest firms (over 100 
employees) are surveyed every year. The ABI is carried out at the level of reporting unit, which is 
typically at the enterprise level.  However, a significant number of enterprises have more than one 
reporting unit.  Selected firms have a statutory duty to provide data to the ABI. 
A limited amount of data (on employment and turnover) is held for all reported units on the 
IDBR.  There is some evidence (Haskel and Khawaja, 2003) that the employment data in the IDBR 
are more reliable that the turnover data.  For this reason, our productivity analysis is based on the 
ABI data alone, with the exception that IDBR employment data are used to derive appropriate 
weights.  Data on the service sector (with Standard Industrial Classifications within sections G-P) 
are available from 1997 through to 2002, albeit with a somewhat more limited set of variables than 
for the production sector. 
Our empirical approach consists of two stages.  In the first stage, we calculate a series of 
labour productivity measures for the gambling sector.  These are broadly comparable with the 
Experimental Productivity Measures currently published for some service industries (but not 
gambling) by the ONS and reported in Daffid, Reed and Vaze (2002).  In the second stage, we   14 
estimate stochastic frontier models.  These exploratory models allow us to test hypotheses relating 
to the determinants of levels and changes in productivity.   
We report labour productivity estimates for gambling using two measures of production: 
gross output and value added and two measures of labour.  We consider these in turn. 
Gross Output (GO) 
Direct measures of gross output are not available in the gambling sector, as they would be in a 
conventional manufacturing industry.  Instead, we construct a measure of gross output as follows:  
GO = turnover + change in work in progress + change in stocks brought for resale + work of a 
capital nature by own staff. 
 
Gross Value Added (GVA) 
Similarly, direct measures of Gross Value Added (GVA) are not contained in the ARD file for 
service industries.  We compute it as follows:  
 GVA = Turnover + Change in Work in Progress at Start and End of Year 
- Purchases. 
 
There is no compelling argument to favour either measure, particularly in the light of the shift to a 
Gross Profits Tax for several gambling sectors over recent years.   
To clarify, the definition of ‘gross profits’ of the operator in the gambling context is the 
difference between revenue received from customers by the operator and payouts to customers.  
This is essentially ‘net revenue’, and excludes operating costs.  In the case of an operator who pays 
out the same as he receives, however, this implies a turnover of zero.  Indeed, if the operator pays 
out more than he receives, this implies a negative turnover!  The same logic applies to the sector as 
a whole.  Similarly, if margins fall due to increased competition, and more is bet in absolute stakes, 
employment may rise.  However, turnover under this definition has fallen.  If we use gross profits, 
therefore, to measure output, we would conclude that output per unit employment has fallen, i.e. 
labour productivity has fallen, and this result would still obtain (though to a lesser extent) even if   15 
employment was unchanged.  At the same time as labour productivity has apparently fallen, bettors 
have lost a lower proportion of the money they staked, and more money has been gambled.  The 
only way in which productivity has fallen is that output, as measured by turnover, has fallen.  If 
margins remain constant, output is unchanged, and this measure is fine as a measure of 
productivity. If margins rise, output as measured rises, and productivity appears to rise.  This is 
also unsatisfactory.  In conclusion, this measure is potentially flawed at least insofar as there are 
significant changes in margins over the period of measurement. 
On the other hand, if stakes are used to measure output, then a fall in margins means an 
increase in stakes, and with a given level of employment, this means more output for the same 
employment, or higher labour productivity.  This is intuitively correct.  If margins stay constant, 
then stakes will not change much, and probably neither will employment.  This is the same thing as 
unchanged productivity.  However, the problem with using stakes to measure output is that more 
can be staked for reasons for example of marketing or because of substitution or complementary 
effects, without there being any real change in output. 
A further ground for caution arises from the fact that for some companies, Box 424 
(Amounts Paid to Winning Customers) is left blank.  This could at least partly due to betting 
exchanges, which do not formally pay out winnings to customers.  However, there may also be 
some a small number of firms who (incorrectly) report net stakes (gross profits) as turnover. 
  In light of this discussion, we perform our analysis based both on turnover (as measured by 
Gross Output) and stakes (as measured by Gross Value Added.  
Labour Measures 
We measure labour using the employment measures reported in the ARD.  The first measure is 
total employment (question wq50).  This includes part-time work.  With the second measure, we 
adjust for part-time employment, assuming that one part-time employee is equivalent to 0.5 full-  16 
time employees.  Part-time employment is given in questions wq52 and wq54, so the second 
measure is calculated as wq50 - 0.5 wq52 - 0.5 wq54). 
  In calculating these measures, we confront three methodological issues: deflation, reporting 
period and weighting for non-selected firms.   There are several possible deflators, including the 
GDP deflator, Producer Price Index (PPI), and the Retail Price Index (RPI), and others.  Here we 
choose to deflate all variables by the Consumer Price Index for Recreation & Culture published 
by the ONS (series CHVS) with the base year of 1996.  Given that we are focusing on a single 
industry study, the choice of deflation measure is less important than with cross-industry studies.  
In any comparisons with other service industries, we use the RPI for consistency.  Reassuringly, 
however, our empirical results are relatively robust to using different measures such as the RPI. 
  For some firms, the reporting period for the data does not cover the standard annual month 
period.  To control for this, we multiply each variable by the number of days in the reporting 
period divided by 365.  We base our productivity estimates on data from the firms selected for the 
ABI.  It is important to control for the fact that larger firms have a greater chance of being selected.  
We control for this by weighting the observations, using as a basis, the employment data from the 
IDBR following the methodology of Haskel and Khawaja (2003). 
 
V. Econometric Model  
  To assess relative productivity, we use stochastic frontier analysis (henceforth, SFA) method 
developed independently by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den 
Broeck (1977).  SFA generates a production (or cost) frontier with a stochastic error term that 
consists of two components: a conventional random error (“white noise”) and a term that 
represents deviations from the frontier, or relative inefficiency.   17 
  SFA can be contrasted with data envelopment analysis (DEA), a non-parametric estimation 
technique that has been used extensively to compute relative productivity in service industries.
3  
DEA and SFA each have key strengths and weaknesses.  DEA is a mathematical programming 
approach that does not require the specification of a functional form for the production function.  It 
can also cope more readily with multiple inputs and outputs than parametric methods. However, 
DEA models are deterministic and highly sensitive to outliers. SFA allows for statistical inference, 
but requires somewhat restrictive functional form and distributional assumptions.   
   In SFA, a production function of the following form is estimated:        
yi   = Xi β +  єi       (3) 
 
where the subscript i denotes the i
th plant or firm, y represents output, X is a vector of inputs, β is 
the unknown parameter vector, and є is an error term with two components, єi =Vi - Ui, where Ui 
represents a non-negative error term to account for technical inefficiency, or failure to produce 
maximal output, given the set of inputs used.  Vi is a symmetric error term that accounts for 
random effects.  The standard assumption (see Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977)) is that the Ui 
and Vi have the following distributions: 
                                                            Ui   ∼  i.i.d.  N
+(0, σ
2
u ),   Ui ≥ 0  
                                                            Vi   ∼  i.i.d.  N(0, σ
2
v ) 
That is, the inefficiency term (Ui ) is assumed to have a half-normal distribution; i.e., 
establishments are either “on the frontier” or below it.  An important parameter in this model is γ = 
σ
2




u), the ratio of the standard error of technical inefficiency to the standard error of 
statistical noise, which is bounded between 0 and 1.  Note that γ = 0 under the null hypothesis of an 
absence of inefficiency, signifying that all of the variance can be attributed to statistical noise.  
  In recent years, SFA models have been developed that allow the technical inefficiency term 
                                                 
3 See Charnes et al. (1994).   18 
to be expressed as a function of a vector of environmental or organizational variables.  This is 
consistent with our argument in the previous that deviations from the frontier (which measure 
relative inefficiency) are related to environmental and organizational factors.  Following 
Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), we assume that the Ui are independently distributed as 
truncations at zero of the N(mi, σ 
2
u) distribution with 
mi  = Zi δ       (4) 
where Z is a vector of environmental, institutional, and organizational variables that are hypothesized to 
influence efficiency and δ is a parameter vector.
4  
  To implement this model, we estimate the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
log(Qit) = β0 + β1 log(Kit) + β2 log(Lit) + β3 log(Mit) + υit - Uit   (5) 
where  
Q = output of firm i in year t. 
K = capital stock 
L = labour 
M = materials 
υit = a standard, “white-noise” error term 
Uit = inefficiency of firm i at time t, assumed to follow the truncated normal 
distribution. 
 
As explained above, the SFA technique allows us to simultaneously estimate the production frontier and 
the determinants of relative efficiency of establishment.   We conjecture that the technical inefficiency 
(Uit) term in equation (13) can be expressed as: 
Uit = δ0 + Σk δk TECHi + δS log(Sit) + µi                                                                             (6) 
 
where TECH refers to a vector of technology indicators and S is market share.   
  There is a long-standing theoretical and empirical literature (see Griliches (1979, 1994) and 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991)) linking proxies for technology (TECH) and productivity.  Market 
                                                 
4 Battese and Coelli (1995) have recently extended this model to incorporate panel data.    19 
share (S) is included in the regression to avoid bias in factor estimates from heterogeneous pricing 
across firms, due, for example to market power (see Carstensen, 2004).    The relative efficiency 
equation we actually estimate is: 
               Ui = δ0 + δ1 COMPi + δ2 TELEPHONEi + δ3 INTERNETi + δS log(Sit) + µi              (7) 
where COMP and TELEPHONE are the ratios of expenditures on computers and telephony, 
respectively, as a proportion of total turnover, INTERNET is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the firm operates via the Internet; 0 otherwise, µ is a white noise term, and time subscripts have 
been suppressed for simplicity.  Note that information on Internet operations is only available since 
2000.  Thus, we estimate the model separately with and without that variable.  We also include 
regional and year dummies as possible determinants of inefficiency. 
  We estimate two panel-data based variants of the production function model.  The first 
variant is a time-varying decay production function, which allows us to formally test whether there 
are efficiency changes over time.  The second variant involves simultaneous estimation of the 
production function and the determinants of relative efficiency, using a one-stage maximum 
likelihood procedure. 
 
VI.  Empirical Results  
  Table 3 summarises the scope of the ARD data for SIC code 92.71: Gambling and Betting 
Activities for the selected and non-selected firms for the years 1997 to 2002.  Not surprisingly, 
these results indicate that the selected firms tend to be larger.   This is a common problem with 
plant-level studies (see Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1991) based on an annual survey, rather than a 
quinennial census of establishments.  More to follow when we have the 2002 numbers in the 
table)   20 
It is important to note two limitations regarding our empirical analysis.  One concern is the 
relatively small number of gambling establishments in the ARD.  In particular, many such 
establishments have few employees, which implies that they have a very low probability of being 
sampled every year.  As a result, we are unable to construct a large panel data set of firms.  As 
discussed above, many recent parametric studies of productivity have employed panel data 
econometric techniques, such as dynamic GMM estimation that are unavailable to us. 
A second limitation is that there is only a single SIC code for the entire gambling sector.  
Thus, we cannot conduct a disaggregated analysis within the gambling industry.  Thus, we are 
likely to have bookmakers, bingo operators and casinos in our sample.  As discussed in Section III 
of this paper, the factors affecting productivity (e.g. tax and technology changes) are often specific 
to one segment of the industry, but our empirical analysis is largely unable to distinguish among 
them.  We do, however, consider one ad hoc mechanism for distinguishing betting from other 
sectors: measures of retail sales.  Retail sales (e.g. of food and alcoholic beverages) are much more 
important for bingo halls and casinos.  For this reason, we distinguish between reporting units with 
a reported retail turnover above a basic minimum level, on the assumption that firms with retail 
sales below this level are more likely to be bookmakers.  Even if this approach is successful, a 
further complication is that some firms in our sample operate in more than one sector of the 
gambling industry (e.g. bookmakers and casino’s).  Given that data on the ARD is provided by 
reporting units our view is that it is unlikely that operations in different sectors will be provided 
under the same reporting unit.  However, the level of the reporting units is determined by the 
enterprise, so it is impossible to be sure of this.  For these reasons, we believe it is important that 
our econometric results be accompanied by detailed qualitative analysis of changes to different 
sectors.   21 
Table 4 presents statistics on the number of enterprises, turnover, employment, gross value 
added, and net capital expenditure from the Annual Business Inquiry for the years 1996 to 2002.  
For comparative purposes, we also report in the same table the data for all firms in Section O 
(“Other community, social and personal service activities”) of the SIC, for all firms in Division 92 
(Recreational Cultural and Sporting Activities) and for firms within class 92.71 (“Gambling and 
betting activities”).  Several stylized facts emerge from this table.  First, note that the number of 
enterprises has decreased by 20.9% since 1996, while employment (from 1998), turnover and 
value added have all increased significantly. 
The pattern of data before and after the change to betting taxation in 2001 is also of 
interest.  Comparing the years immediately before and after the tax change (2000 and 2002), 
turnover has increased by 38.3% and GVA by 74.8%.
5  We conjecture that there are two reasons 
for this positive response.  First, the effective tax rate was lowered significantly, which should lead 
to an increase in the demand for betting.  Although some of the demand may have come from other 
gambling sectors, there is clear evidence (Paton, Siegel and Vaughan Williams, 2002) that the tax 
decrease led to an expansion in total gambling.  Second, we conjecture that many businesses 
decided to repatriate phone and Internet business to the UK from off-shore locations in response to 
the tax decrease.  There are, however, two particularly striking features of the increase in gambling 
activity. 
The first is that GVA appears to have increased much more than turnover.  This is 
somewhat of a surprise.  There is evidence that the shift to GPT stiffened competition in betting 
and reduced margins (Paton, Vaughan Williams and Siegel, 2002).  As a consequence, one would 
expect that turnover would increase faster than gross margins.  Indeed the likelihood of this 
                                                 
5 The reason for focussing on these two years is the tax changes took place during the course of 2001.  
Specifically, the changes were announced in the April 2001 and were introduced in October of that year.    22 
happening was highlighted in the discussion on different output measures in gambling.  We believe 
that the most likely explanations for the dramatic increase in value added lie in the growth of 
importance of two segments of the market: betting exchanges and fixed odds betting terminals 
(FOBT).  It is very difficult to compare turnover measures between betting exchanges and 
conventional betting.  Even across different betting exchanges there are differences in how they 
measure turnover - sometimes it is the amount matched (adding up the back and lay sides of the 
bet), sometimes it is the amount at risk on the lay side.   
The second striking feature of the increase in turnover and GVA is that employment 
increased by just 2.26% between 2000 and 2002 and employment costs were virtually unchanged.  
Thus, the huge expansion of gambling investment and activity appears to have been undertaken 
without any increase in employment.  Obviously there are employment considerations that may of 
interest, but, for the purposes of this report, this is prima facie evidence of a massive increase in 
gambling productivity between 2000 and 2002. 
The final variable worth noting is Total Net Capital Expenditure.  This series dips by from 
236 to 185 between 1999 and 2000, before rising to 446 in 2002 (an increase of 114% on the 1996 
figure).  Thus, there is some evidence that uncertainty over the regulatory and tax situation prior to 
2001 severely limited investment in the gambling sector.  However, after the more-favourable tax 
regime was announced in early 2001, investment started to accelerate. 
We now use the establishment level data that are available to us to look closer at 
productivity changes and determinants in gambling.  We present labour productivity estimates for 
1997 to 2002 using the different productivity measures as described in the previous section, 
weighted for non-selected firms.  Estimates using Gross Output and Gross Value Added 
specifications of the production function are summarised in Table 5.  For each measure we report   23 
the values using total numbers in employment and full time equivalent employment as described 
above.  (We can’t discuss this until clearance is received from IBRD)  
  Of course these results relate only to labour productivity.  We have argued above that 
investment in technology has been of particular importance in this industry, so it is potentially 
misleading to make inferences regarding economic performance based on partial productivity 
measures.  Thus, in the next section we present the more formal SFA analysis of productivity and 
determinants. 
  Table 6 presents estimates of SFA Cobb-Douglas production functions, using Gross Output 
(GO) and Gross Value Added (GVA) and the dependent variables. There are some notable 
differences between the results based on GO and those based on GVA.  Firstly, the Coelli (1995) 
test provides strong evidence of the presence of an inefficiency term for GVA but not for GO.    
Secondly, for GO, the coefficient on labour (an estimate of the output elasticity of labour, given 
our log-linear specification) is 0.284 (standard error 0.027), the coefficient on capital is 0.704 
(0.022), whilst that for materials is 0.021 (0.207).  Note the latter coefficient is not statistically 
significant, which could be due to measurement error.   For these values, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale.  For GVA, the coefficient on labour is higher at 0.586 
(0.036) whilst that for capital is much smaller at 0.368 (0.028).  In this case, there is evidence of 
increasing returns to scale.  This pattern of results is repeated through most of our experiments 
reported below.  Thus, it is clear that, as expected, the choice of output measure is very important 
in this context.  One possibility is that the differences between results may be driven by the 
divergence between GO and GVA in 2002 reported above.  However, when the model is estimated 
without the 2002 data (not reported here), the estimates are changed very little.  
  In the next phase of our analysis, we retrieve the efficiency scores and summarise these 
year-by-year in Table 7. [Results not yet released by IBRD]   24 
  We provide a formal test of the hypothesis of changing productivity over time by 
estimating the time-varying decay model.  These results are reported in the second half of Table 6.  
The coefficient on the decay parameter is positive for both output measures, but significant only 
for GVA.  The interpretation of a positive coefficient is that the inefficiency component is 
decreasing over time.  In other words, we find some evidence that efficiency has increased over 
time, at least when measured by GVA.  Note also that the elasticity estimates associated with the 
time-varying decay model (columns 3 and 4) appear to be more plausible. 
  We have already seen how there has been a significant increase in the productivity of 
gambling after 2001.  Productivity differentials across firms are also of interest.  Here we consider 
the results of including three factors on expected efficiency levels: regional effects, intensity of 
expenditure on computer equipment, and intensity of expenditure on telecommunications.  Our 
expectations are that there will be significant regional differences in efficiency and the computers 
and telecommunications expenditure will be positively associated with efficiency.  The results are 
reported in Table 8.  Note that a significantly positive coefficient in the inefficiency equation 
means that variable is associated with greater inefficiency (lower efficiency). 
  As expected, there appears to be significant variations in regional efficiency.  Relative to 
London and the South East (the reference region) and the East of England, Scotland/Wales, the 
North and the West are found to be less efficient.  The coefficients on the time dummies shed more 
light on the timing of productivity improvements over time.  The coefficient on the 2002 dummy is 
negative and strongly significant in both models and no other coefficient is significant at the 5% 
level.  This suggests a clear jump in efficiency in 2002, as opposed to a gradual improvement over 
the whole period. 
  The results on technology are mixed.  The proportion of spending on computing is 
associated with significantly greater inefficiency for GO, but less inefficiency for GVA.  Spending   25 
on telecommunications appears to be associated with greater inefficiency.  In the second half of 
Table 8, we report the results using the indicator variable for whether or not the firm receives 
orders on the Internet.  This may be particularly important in this industry where virtually all 
activity of some firms is carried out online.  Note that information on this variable is only available 
from 1999 and so the sample size is considerably reduced.  We find that Internet operations are 
significantly associated with lower inefficiency (more efficiency) in both the GO and GVA 
models, significantly so in the case of the former. 
  To summarise, we find that productivity improved significantly in 2002, following the 
2001 tax change.  Productivity appears to be relatively high in London and the South East and the 
Eastern parts of England.  Lastly, our results on technology are somewhat conflicting.  We find 
evidence suggesting that firms investing heavily in new technology are actually less efficient than 
other firms, but that gambling firms operating online are more efficient than traditional operators. 
  We now report the results from several robustness checks.  These findings are reported in 
Tables 9 and 10.  The first robustness check is undertaken in the light of the concern express above 
that some firms do not record winnings paid to customers.  We re-estimate the conditional mean 
production functions excluding these firms and the results are reported in the first two columns of 
Table 9. 
  There are some quite striking differences in the results compared to those reported in Table 
8.  Taking the production functions first, the coefficients on employment in both GO and GVA 
models are estimated to be much lower than before, and those on capital, higher.  The coefficient 
on market share is now positive and strongly significant in both models.  Looking at the 
inefficiency equation, the proportion of spend on computers is now associated with significantly 
higher productivity in the GVA model and is insignificant in the GO model.  There is also less 
evidence of regional differences in efficiency for both models.  Lastly, for the GO model, there is   26 
evidence of a more gradual increase in efficiency over time rather than a ‘jump’ just in 2002, 
whilst in the GVA model, we find no evidence of increasing productivity over time. 
  The second robustness check involves the use of full time equivalent employment instead 
of total number of employees.  These results are reported in the second half of Table 9.  The results 
are closer to those reported in the first half of Table 8, suggesting that the choice of employment 
measure is not so critical.  A major difference is that the coefficient on the 2002 dummy is still 
negative, but insignificantly so in the GVA model. 
  Our final robustness check is to estimate output as a function of all the independent 
variables using standard panel data techniques.  As we have only a small number of firms with 
more than two continuous observations, we do not report fixed effects estimates.  Rather, in Table 
10, we report random effects estimates for GO and GVA.  The production equation parameters and 
their significance are very close in value to those estimated by the frontier analysis.  Further, we 
see the same pattern of regional and time differences to that reported in Table 8.  This provides 
some reassurance for our central results. 
VII.  Preliminary Conclusions  
  In this paper, we have conducted an exploratory analysis of productivity in a service 
industry, using plant-level data from gambling establishments on turnover, employment, gross 
value added and net capital expenditure from the U.K. Annual Business Inquiry.  A key stylized 
fact is that the number of enterprises decreased by 20.9% from 1996 to 2002, while employment, 
turnover, and value added have all increased significantly over the same period.  Significantly, 
GVA appears to have increased much more than turnover.  We believe that the most likely 
explanation for the dramatic increase in value added lies in the growing impact of two segments of 
the market: betting exchanges and fixed-odds betting terminals (FOBTs).  Significantly also,   27 
despite the increase in turnover and GVA, employment increased by just 2.26% between 2000 and 
2002 and employment costs were virtually unchanged.  Thus, the huge expansion of gambling 
investment and activity appears to have been undertaken without any increase in employment.   
  Next, we estimated Cobb-Douglas stochastic production functions for Gross Output (GO) 
and Gross Value Added (GVA).  These results appear to be plausible and demonstrate that 
production frontiers can be estimated in service industries, as well as in manufacturing sectors.  We 
note some key differences between the results based on GO and those based on GVA.  In 
particular, we find strong evidence of the presence of an inefficiency term for GVA but not for 
GO.    This confirms our expectation that the choice of output measure is very important in this 
context.  One possibility is that the differences between results may be driven by the divergence 
between GO and GVA in 2002 reported above.  However, when the model is estimated without the 
2002 data (not reported here), the estimates are changed very little. 
  We also provide a formal test of the hypothesis of a shift in productivity over time, by 
estimating the time-varying decay model.  The coefficient on the decay parameter is positive for 
both output measures, but significant only for GVA.  The interpretation of a positive coefficient is 
that the inefficiency component is decreasing over time.  In other words, we find some evidence 
that efficiency has increased over time, at least when measured by GVA.   
   Next we consider the results of including three factors on expected efficiency levels: 
regional effects, intensity of expenditure on computer equipment and intensity of expenditure on 
telecommunications.  As expected, we find evidence of significant variations in regional 
efficiency.  Relative to London and the South East (the reference region), Scotland/Wales, the 
North and the West are all found to be less efficient in at least some specifications.   
  The results on technology are mixed.  The proportion of spending on computing is 
associated with significantly greater inefficiency for GO, but less inefficiency for GVA.  Spending   28 
on telecommunications appears to be associated with greater inefficiency.  We find that Internet 
operations are associated with lower inefficiency (more efficiency) in both the GO and GVA 
models, significantly so in the case of the former. 
  To summarize, we find productivity to be high in London and the South East and the 
Eastern parts of England, relative to other areas.  We find conflicting evidence on the relationship 
between expenditure on information technology and relative productivity.  However, it appears as 
though gambling firms that operate online are more efficient than traditional operators.  These 
results appear to be sensitive to several robustness checks.    29 
References 
Aigner, Dennis J., C.A. Knox Lovell, and Peter Schmidt. (1977). ‘Formulation and Estimation of 
Stochastic Frontier Production Functions’, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 6, pp. 21-37.  
Baily, Martin N. and Robert J. Gordon (1988), ‘The Productivity Slowdown, Measurement Issues, 
and the Explosion of Computer Power’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2, 
pp. 347-420. 
Battese, George and Tim Coelli.( 1995).  ‘A Model for Technical Inefficiency Effects in a 
Stochastic Frontier Production Function for Panel Data’, Empirical Economics, Vol. 20, 
pp. 325-332. 
Baumol, William J. (1967), “Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban 
Crisis,” American Economic Review, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 415-426.  
Baumol, William J., Anne B. Blackman, and Edward N. Wolff (1985), “Unbalanced Growth 
Revisited: Asymptotic Stagnancy and New Evidence,” American Economic Review, Vol. 
75, No. 4, pp. 806-817.  
Baumol, William J. and Edward N. Wolff (1984), ‘On Inderindustry Differences in Absolute 
Productivity’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 92, pp. 1017-34. 
Berndt, Ernst R., and Catherine J. Morrison (1995), ‘High-Tech Capital Formation and Economic 
Performance in U.S. Manufacturing Industries’, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 65, pp. 9-
43. 
Brynjolfsson Erik and Lorin M. Hitt (1996). ‘Paradox Lost: Firm Level Evidence on Returns to 
Information Systems Spending’, Management Science, Vol. 42, pp. 541-558.   
   30 
Carstensen, Vivian (2004), ‘A Simple Method to Control for Heterogeneous Price Setting and 
Market Power of Firms in Productivity Estimates’, Royal Economic Society Conference, 
Swansea, April. 
Charnes, Abraham., William W. Cooper, Arie Lewin, and Lawrence M. Seiford, eds. (1994).  Data 
Envelopment Analysis: Theory, Method, and Applications, Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Chinloy, Peter (1980), ‘Sources of Quality Change in Labor Input’, American Economic Review, 
Vol. 70, pp. 108-119.  
Christiansen, G.B. and Haveman, R.H. (1980), ‘The Determinants of the Decline in Measured 
Productivity Growth: an Evaluation’, in Special Study on Economic Change, Washington, 
DC: Congress of the United States. 
Christiansen, G.B. and Haveman, R.H. (1981), ‘Public Regulations and the Slowdown in 
Productivity Growth’, American Economic Review, Vol. 71, pp. 320-25. 
Coelli, Timothy J. (1995), ‘Estimators and Hypothesis Tests for a Stochastic Frontier Function: a 
Monte Carlo analysis’, Journal of Productivity Analysis, Vol.64, no. 4, pp.247-68. 
Craig, C.E. and Harris, R.C. (1973), ‘Total Productivity Measurement at the Firm Level’, Sloan 
Management Review, Vol. 14, pp. 13-29. 
Criscuolo, Chiara, Jonathan Haskel, and Ralf Martin (2003), ‘Building the Evidence Base for 
Productivity Policy using Business Data Linking’, Economic Trends, 600 (Nov), 39-51. 
Daffin, Chris, Geoff Reed, Prabhat Vaze 2002), ‘Labour Productivity measures for the Non-
production Industries’, Economic Trends, 579 (Feb), 41-56. 
Dean, Edwin, Kent Kunze, and Larry Rosenblum (1988), ‘Productivity Change and the 
Measurement of Heterogeneous Labor Inputs’, paper presented at the U.S.-Israeli 
Department-to-Ministry Seminar Program, October 17-20.     31 
DCMS (2002), A Safe Bet for Success, Modernising Britain's Gambling Laws. 
Disney, Richard, Jonathan Haskel, and Ylva Heden (2000), ‘Restructuring and Productivity 
Change in U.K. Manufacturing’, University of Nottingham, mimeo. 
DTI (2002), Productivity and Competitiveness Indicators Update, London: Department of Trade 
and Industry. 
Fixler, Dennis J. and Donald Siegel (1999), ‘Outsourcing and Productivity Growth in Services’, 
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 10, 2, 177-194. 
Fixler, Dennis J. and Kimberly Zieschang (1992), ‘User Costs, Shadow Prices, and the Real Output 
of Banks’, in Z. Griliches, ed. Output Measurement in the Service Sector,  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 219-244. 
Foster, Lucia, John C. Haltiwanger, Cornell J. Krizan, (2001), ‘Aggregate Productivity Growth: 
Lessons from Microeconomic Evidence’, in New Developments in Productivity Analysis, 
Edwin Dean, Michael Harper, and Charles Hulten, eds., Chicago: University of Chicago 
press, 303-3721.  
Fuchs, Victor R. (1968), The Service Economy, National Bureau of Economic Research, New 
York: Columbia University Press.  
Griffith, Rachel (1999), ‘Using the ARD Establishment Level Data to Look at Foreign Ownership 
and Productivity in the United Kingdom’, The Economic Journal, 109 (June): F416-F442. 
Griliches, Zvi (1979), ‘Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to 
Productivity Growth’, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 92-116. 
Griliches, Zvi (1987), ‘Productivity: Measurement Problems’ in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. 
Newman, eds., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, London: Macmillan. 
Griliches, Zvi (1994), ‘Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint’, American Economic Review, 
84, 1, 1-23.   32 
Haskel, Jonathan and Naveed Khawaja (2003), ‘Productivity in UK Retailing: evidence from 
micro data’, Centre for Research into Business Activity Discussion Paper. 
HM Customs & Excise/Gaming Board for Great Britain/Mintel (2003), in Mintel Leisure 
Intelligence (2003), Remote Betting. 
HM Customs and Excise (2003), Notice 451, May, London: HM Customs & Excise 
HM Treasury (2000), Productivity in the UK: the evidence and the Government’s approach, 
London: HM Treasury. 
Jorgenson, Dale W., Frank W. Gollop, and Barbara Fraumeni (1987), Productivity and U.S. 
Economic Growth, 1979-1985, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Key Note Market Report (2002), Betting & Gaming, October. 44)  
Lichtenberg, Frank R (1995). ‘The Output Contributions of Computer Equipment and Personnel: 
  A Firm-Level Analysis’, Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Vol. 3, No.3, pp. 
  201-217. 
 
Lichtenberg, Frank and Donald Siegel (1991). ‘The Impact of R&D Investment on Productivity-
New Evidence Using Linked R&D-LRD Data’, Economic Inquiry, 29, 2, 203-229 
McGuckin, Robert H. and Sang V. Nguyen (1995),’On Productivity and Plant Ownership Change: 
Evidence from the LRD’, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 257-276. 
Meeusen, W. and J. Van den Broeck. (1977), ‘Efficiency Estimation from Cobb-Douglas 
Production Functions with Composed Errors’, International Economic Review, 18, 435-
444. 
Mintel Leisure Intelligence (2003), Remote Betting, July. 
Mohr, Michael F. (1992), ‘Recent and Planned Improvements in the Measurement and Deflation of 
Services Outputs and Inputs in BEA's Gross Product Originating Estimates’, in Z.   33 
Griliches, ed. Output Measurement in the Service Sector, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 25-68. 
Nordhaus, William D. (2002), ‘Productivity Growth and the New Economy’, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 2, 211-244.  
Paton, David  and Vaughan Williams, Leighton (2001), Monopoly Rents and Price Fixing in 
Betting Markets, Review of Industrial Organization, November, 19, 3, 265-278. 
Perloff, Jeffrey M. and Michael L. Wachter (1980), ‘The Productivity Slowdown: A Labor 
Problem?’ in The Decline in Productivity Growth, Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston. 
Reifschneider, David and Rodney Stevenson. (1991). Systematic Departures from the Frontier: A 
Framework for the Analysis of Firm Inefficiency. International Economic Review, 32, 3, 
715-723.  
Siegel, Donald (1994), ‘Errors of Output Deflators Revisited: Unit Values and the Producer Price 
Index’, Economic Inquiry, 32, 1, 11-32. 
Siegel, Donald (1995), ‘Errors of Measurement and the Recent Acceleration of Productivity 
Growth’, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 6, 4, 297-320. 
Siegel, Donald (1997), ‘The Impact of Investments in Computers on Manufacturing Productivity 
Growth: A Multiple-Indicators, Multiple-Causes Approach’, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 79, 1, 68-78. 
Siegel, Donald and Zvi Griliches (1992), ‘Purchased Services, Outsourcing, Computers, and 
Productivity in Manufacturing’, in Z. Griliches, ed. Output Measurement in the Service 
Sector, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 429-458 (also appeared as National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3678).   34 
ten Raa, Thijs and Edward N. Wolff (2001), ‘Outsourcing of Services and the Productivity 
Recovery in U.S. Manufacturing Industries in the 1980s and 1990s’, Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, 16, 2, 149-165.   35 
Table 1 
U.K. Gambling Stakes by Segment, 1998-2002 
 
  1998    2002    % change 
  £m  %  £m  %  1998-2002 
Betting  7,109  29  17,502  49  +146.2 
Gaming 
Machines 
8,489  34  8,585  24  +1.1 
National 
Lottery 
5,207  21  4,640  13  -10.9 
Casinos  2,669  11  3,850  11  +44.2 
Bingo  1,041  4  1,200  3  +15.3 
Football Pools  264  1  130  0  -50.8 
Total  24,779  100  35,907  100  +44.9 
 
Source: HM Customs & Excise/Gaming Board for Great Britain/Mintel (2003)   36 
Table 2 
U.K. Pay-TV households, by platform, 1998-2003 
 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003* 
  m  m  m  m  m  m 
Analogue satellite  3.8  1.7  0.4  0.1  -  - 
Digital satellite  0.3  2.5  4.7  5.3  6.3  6.4 
Analogue cable  2.9  3.2  2.6  2.1  1.3  1.2 
Digital cable  -  0.1  0.8  1.5  2.1  2.1 
Terrestrial digital  0.1  0.5  1.0  1.1  1.7  1.6** 
Other free-to-air  -  -  -  -  -  0.7*** 
Total  7.1  8.0  9.5  10.1  11.4  12.0 
% penetration  29  33  38  40  44  48 
*   as at March 2003 
**   Freeview subscribers 
***   the estimated number of Sky digital viewers that watch freeview channels only and do 
not pay for packages 
 
Source: Mintel (2003)   37 
Table 3 
 
IBRD Data for Non-selected Gambling Firms 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Enterprises  1861  1860  1818  1681  1592   
Mean Employment  24.98  20.46  23.13  16.29  13.22   
250+  8  7  8  3  4   
100-249  40  24  27  27  28   
50-99  69  46  60  61  52   
20-49  186  173  162  142  138   
10-19  310  292  284  263  232   
<10  1,238  1,318  1,277  1,185  1,138   
 
                                       IBRD Data for Selected Gambling Firms 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Enterprises  96  113  94  105  120   
Total Employment  318.85  346.96  384.27  479.12  543.3   
250+  20  20  18  23  24   
100-249  15  22  20  17  19   
50-99  8  19  12  14  20   
20-49  15  18  15  16  24   
10-19  9  17  12  14  11   
<10  29  17  17  21  22     38 
Table 4 
Summary Data from ABI for Other Services, Recreation and Gambling 














         Number  £ million  £ m  ‘000  £ m  £ million 
1996  148,924  52,511  21,721  ..  7,874  4,089 
1997  145,797  58,751  24,270  ..  9,381  5,767 
1998  168,046  65,284  25,991  1,132  13,085  5,774 
1999  170,495  72,057  30,238  1,212  15,042  6,642 
2000  170,562  77,891  31,947  1,271  16,580  6,163 







activities   2002  173,589  94,187  38,327  1,352  20,017  6,582 
                          
1996  62,450  35,313  12,184  ..  4,866  1,650 
1997  63,674  40,542  13,656  ..  6,198  2,555 
1998  65,261  41,353  13,494  524  6,714  2,253 
1999  68,009  45,383  16,031  581  7,925  2,621 
2000  69,378  50,930  18,331  638  9,098  2,688 





activities  2002  71,549  64,157  22,778  672  11,257  2,997 
                          
1996  2,240  11,849  1,462  ..  708  208 
1997  2,061  13,229  1,907  ..  708  262 
1998  2,076  13,938  1,834  76  760  202 
1999  2,009  14,831  2,329  77  751  236 
2000  1,878  16,503  2,620  88  1,111  185 




activities  2002  1,770  22,825  4,172  90  1,199  446 
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Table 5 
Weighted Mean Labour Productivity in Gambling Based on Gross Output 
[Still awaiting clearance from IBRD] 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Overall Mean 
(employees) 
207.3  215.7  235.2  198.4  369.9   
250+             
100-249             
50-99             
20-49             
10-19             
<10             
             
Overall Mean 
(FTE) 
245.0  248.7  296.8  240.7  502.3   
250+             
100-249             
50-99             
20-49             
10-19             
<10             
 
 
             Weighted Mean Labour Productivity in Gambling Based on GVA 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Overall Mean 
(employees) 
75.2  82.3  86.1  65.4  84.7   
250+             
100-249             
50-99             
20-49             
10-19             
<10             
             
Overall Mean 
(FTE) 
86.0  93.2  108.9  76.2  107.9   
250+             
100-249             
50-99             
20-49             
10-19             
<10             
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Table 6 
SFA Gambling Production Functions, 1997-2002 
                                                                 Dependent Variable  
Coefficient on:   GO  GVA  GO  GVA 
















Materials  0.021 
(0.207) 
-  0.067*** 
(0.021) 
- 












         
N  396  478  396  478 
Log Likelihood  -340.50  -610.81  -322.40  -479.14 
Wald χ
2  7871.2***  2939.8  4444.5***  1330.9*** 
Inefficiency  -0.629  8.297***  -  - 
CRS test  0.56  5.71**  2.47  13.3*** 
 
Notes 
(i) All production function variables are specified in logs. 
(ii) *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. 
(iii) The inefficiency term is assumed to follow a truncated normal distribution. 
(iv) “Inefficiency” indicates test statistics for the presence of an inefficiency term using the Coelli (1995) one sided 
test. 
(v) “CRS test” indicates a two-sided test of the null of constant returns to scale. 
(vi) “Time Decay” is an estimate of how the degree of inefficiency is changing over time.  When Time Decay > 0, 
this indicates that inefficiency is decreasing over time.  41 
Table 7: SFA Efficiency Scores, 1997-2002 
 
[Still awaiting clearance from BDL]  42 
Table 8 
SFA Conditional Mean Production Functions: 1997-2002 
                                                                                    Dependent Variable  
Coefficient on:  GO  GVA  GO  GVA 
















Materials  0.059*** 
(0.021) 
-  0.065** 
(0.029) 
- 








Inefficiency Equation         
























































-  - 




-  - 


















reference year  reference year 








N  396  478  244  252 
Log Likelihood  -319.21  -596.35  -207.62  -317.10 
Wald χ
2  7441.7***  2797.0***  4434.1***  1436.0*** 
Notes 
(i) See Table 6, notes (i) to (iii). 
(ii) Regional dummies are specified using London as the reference area.  Year dummies are specified using 1997 as the 
reference year.  When Internet is included as an explanatory variable, 2002 is the reference year. 
(iii)  In these specifications, the inefficiency term is modelled as a linear function of variables.  A significantly negative 
coefficient implies that variable is associated with an increase in inefficiency.   43 
Table 9 
SFA Production Functions-Robustness Checks 
                                                                      Dependent Variable 
  Non-retail & FTE 
employment (Labour1) 
Market share in 
inefficiency equation 
Coefficient on:   GO  GVA  GO  GVA 
















Materials  0.028 
(0.021) 
-  0.052** 
(0.021) 
- 








         
Inefficiency Equation         








































































-  -0.083 
(0.144) 






















N  332  400  396  478 
Log Likelihood  -261.91  -493.19***  -317.34  -580.68 
Wald χ
2  6890.7***  2397.6***  1472.0***  228.88*** 
Notes 
(i) See Table 6, notes (i) to (iii).   44 
Table 10 
Random Effects Production Functions, 1997-2002 
                                                    Dependent Variable  
Coefficient on:   GO  GVA 








Materials  0.084*** 
(0.020) 
- 
































1999  dropped  0.101 
(0.074) 
















     
N  396  478 
Wald χ
2  4814.0***  1543.4*** 
 
Notes 
(i) Parameters are the GLS random effects estimates. 
(ii) See Table 6, notes (i) and (ii) and Table 8, note 2.  45 
APPENDIX 
Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION  Mean (£000)  SD 
Gross Output (GO)  Log(Turnover + change in work in 
progress + change in stocks brought for 
resale + work of a capital nature by own 
staff.) 
8.529  2.525 
Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Log(Turnover + Change in Work in 
Progress at Start and End of Year – 
Purchases) 
7.513  2.325 
Capital  Log(capital stock 
 
8.658  2.742 
Labour   Log(total number of employees)  4.221  2.099 
Labour1  Log(total number of employees - half 
number of part-time employees) 
3.969  2.110 
Share  Log(firm IBRD employment/total 
industry IBRD employment) 
-2.406  1.974 
Materials   Log (Purchases)     
Computer intensity  Purchases of computer & related services 
as a proportion of turnover 
0.255  0.558 
Telephone intensity  Purchases of telephony services as a 
proportion of turnover 
0.821  1.866 
Internet sales  = 1 if goods and orders are received via 
the Internet. 
0.766  0.424 
North  Dummy variable = 1 if firm is located in 
Yorkshire, North East, Lancashire or 
Cumbria 
0.316  0.465 
West  Dummy variable = 1 if firm is located in 
West Midlands or South West 
0.149  0.356 
East  Dummy variable = 1 if firm is located in 
East Midlands or East Anglia 
0.153  0.360 
Scotland/Wales  Dummy variable = 1 if firm is located in 
Wales or Scotland 
0.174  0.380 
London  Dummy variable = 1 if firm is located in 
London or South East 
0.209  0.407 
 
Notes 
(i) Summary statistics are calculated using the GVA sample, N = 478. 
(ii) All variables are deflated to 1996 constant prices using the CPI for Recreation & Culture, series - CHVS, with the 
exception of capital stock which is calculated by ONS and deflated to 1995 prices. 